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Abstract—We consider the secure beamforming transmission
over a quasi-static block fading channel from a multi-antenna
transmitter to a desired single-antenna receiver, in the presence
of a passive single-antenna eavesdropper. We focus on a practical
scenario where the transmitter can only acquire the statistical
channel knowledge of the eavesdropper and the partial channel
knowledge of the legitimate receiver through a finite amount
of signaling overhead. To keep control of the outage events
caused by the limited channel knowledge, We firstly propose a
strategy to determine the wiretap code parameters under the
outage constraints, based on which we establish a necessary
transmission condition to guarantee a positive secrecy rate.
Aided by this transmission condition, we propose an on-off-based
transmission scheme and characterize the secrecy throughput
performance of the system. Our designed transmission scheme
is beneficial for the deployment of physical layer security in
practical frequency division duplex (FDD) systems with limited
training and feedback.
Index Terms—Secure beamforming, on-off transmission, lim-
ited training and feedback overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, there has been an increased
interest in physical layer security to protect the wireless
communications against eavesdropping. The seminal work
in this area can be traced back to Wyner, who concluded
in [1] that secure communication can be achieved at the
physical layer. This conclusion has fueled much research work
to investigate physical layer security. Many of these early
studies have in common that the transmitter can obtain perfect
channel state information (CSI). Such idealized conditions
bring us attractive advantages. However, since the training and
feedback overhead is practically limited, the transmitter can
never obtain perfect channel knowledge of the receiver and/or
the eavesdropper [2].
Recently, there has been several studies that have designed
practical secure transmission schemes under imperfect CSI [3–
6]. Specifically, considering the channel estimation errors, the
on-off mechanism was adopted to design an practical secure
transmission scheme [3]. Focusing on the quantized channel
feedback, the artificial-noise-aided beamforming scheme was
optimized to guarantee security for the fast fading channels [4]
and the slow fading channels [5]. For block fading channels,
the non-trivial tradeoff between the signaling overhead and
the effective data transmission in wiretap channels was char-
acterized in [6], which defined the effective ergodic secrecy
rate (ESR) as the performance metric and investigated the
optimization problem for maximization of effective ESR.
In this paper, we consider the multi-input single-output
single-eavesdropper (MISOSE) scenario in block fading chan-
nels and concentrate on a practical CSI assumption that the
transmitter can only obtain the statistical channel knowledge
to the eavesdropper and partial channel knowledge to the
legitimate receiver through finite signaling overhead. Due to
this imperfect channel knowledge, there inevitably occurs
two kinds of practical issues, i.e., connection outage event
and secrecy outage event. The former is due to the lack of
perfect channel knowledge of the legitimate receiver, while the
latter is due to the lack of perfect channel knowledge of the
eavesdropper. To guarantee the target levels of reliability and
security in the considered wiretap channel, we design an on-
off-based secure beamforming transmission scheme under dual
outage constraints. In particular, we first establish a necessary
transmission condition on the channel knowledge known at the
transmitter to ensure that a positive secrecy rate is available
under dual outage constraints. That is, the transmission should
be allowed only when the quality of the main channel is
larger than the designated threshold. Built upon this condition,
we then design an on-off secure transmission scheme and
characterize the secrecy throughput by averaging the secrecy
rate over all channel realizations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we provide an overview of the MISOSE scenario with training
and feedback overhead. In Section III, we characterize the
connection and secrecy outage performance. In Section IV,
we design the on-off transmission scheme under dual outage
constraints. In Section V and VI, we present some numerical
simulations and summarize our main findings.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISOSE scenario where the M -antenna
transmitter (Alice) communicates with a desired single-
antenna receiver (Bob) in the presence of a passive single-
antenna eavesdropper (Eve). The Alice-Bob link is referred
to as the main channel, and the Alice-Eve link is referred to
as the eavesdropper’s channel. A quasi-static Rayleigh block
fading model is assumed such that the channel coefficients are
independent identically distributed (i.i.d) complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unit variance across the
coherence blocks, but hold constant for a certain transmission
block before changing independently.
In this work, we consider a practical scenario, where Eve
is just an ordinary user of the network whose detection
performance has no prior to Bob, such that Eve performs the
same as Bob to estimate her channel by computing a minimum
mean square error (MMSE) estimation based on the training
symbols. After the channel estimation process, Bob uses the
noisy channel estimation to choose the nearest transmit beam-
forming vector from a codebook known a prior at Alice and
Bob, and then feeds back the index of associated beamformer
vector to Alice. Since Eve behaves as a passive eavesdropper,
the instantaneous knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel
cannot be acquired by Alice.
A. System Input-Output Relationship
We assume that Alice transmits a modulated symbol s
chosen from a constellation S with unit variance. Before trans-
mission on antenna i, the symbol is weighted by a complex
number vi. The weights for all antennas can be collected into
an M1 unitary beamforming vector v = [v1; v2;    ; vM ]T .
Let hi denote the channel coefficient between the single
received antenna at Bob and the i-th transmit antenna at Alice,
such that hi  CN (0; 1) and the main channel vector is
h = [h1; h2;    ; hM ]. Thus the received symbol at Bob is
written as
y = hvs+ nb; (1)
where nb is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob
with variance 2b .
Furthermore, we denote gi as the channel coefficient be-
tween the single received antenna at Eve and the i-th transmit
antenna at Alice, such that gi  CN (0; 1) and the eavesdrop-
per’s channel vector is g = [g1; g2;    ; gM ]. As such, the
received symbol at Eve is written as
z = gvs+ ne; (2)
where ne is the AWGN at Eve with variance 2e .
B. Training and Feedback Process
In this subsection, we describe the detailed process of how
Alice acquires the actual CSI by exploiting the finite training
and feedback overhead.
1) Channel Estimation at Bob and Eve: We assume that
Bob computes the linear MMSE estimation of h given T train-
ing symbols, such that we have h = h^+m, where the estimat-
ed channel h^ and the estimated error m contain i.i.d complex
Gaussian elements, satisfying h^  CN  0; (1  2m)IM and
m  CN  0; 2mIM, respectively. According to [7], 2m is
formulated as
2m =
1
1 + b T
: (3)
where b = 1=2b denotes the average signal-to-noise (SNR)
of the received signal at Bob without estimation error, and
T = T=M is the normalized number of training symbols.
Also, Eve computes the linear MMSE estimation of g
as g = g^ + w, where the estimated channel g^ and the
estimated error w contain i.i.d complex Gaussian elements,
satisfying g^  CN  0; (1  2w)IM and w  CN  0; 2wIM,
respectively. Similar to (3), 2w is given by
2w =
1
1 + e T
; (4)
where e = 1=2e denotes the average SNR of the received
signal at Eve without estimation error.
2) Quantization at Bob: After channel estimation process,
Bob needs to convey back the index of the particular beam-
forming vector to Alice via B bits over a feedback channel.
Specifically, Bob selects the SNR-maximizing beamforming
vector v from a codebook V = fv1;v2;    ;v2Bg, yielding
v = argmax
fi2V
jh^f ij2; (5)
after which the index of the selected beamforming vector is
fed back to Alice.
After the CDI feedback process, Bob also needs to convey
back the CQI to Alice. Different from the CDI quantization,
which needs many feedback bits especially when M is very
large, the CQI is just a positive real number and can be
quantized efficiently using a small number of bits [5, 8, 9].
As such, to concentrate on the impact of CDI quantization, in
this work we assume that Alice can perfectly obtain the CQI
without consuming the block resources.
C. Wiretap Codes Design
We now construct a parameter pair (Rb; Re) for the wiretap
code [1], where Rb denotes the codeword transmission rate and
Re denotes the rate redundancy which provides secrecy against
eavesdropping. To guarantee the reliability and security levels,
in this work we choose the largest possible codeword rate Rb
while keeping the required reliability level at Bob, and we
also choose the smallest possible rate redundancy Re while
providing the required security level against eavesdropping,
both from a probabilistic sense [5]. By doing so, we maximize
the achievable secrecy rate (Rs = Rb Re), while the risks of
decoding error and being eavesdropped are both under control.
III. OUTAGE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we characterize the dual outage probabilities,
i.e., the connection outage probability and the secrecy outage
probability. Specifically, by designing a back off strategy to
determine the codeword rate, we present a brief expression
to calculate the connection probability. Furthermore, given
a predetermined rate redundancy, we derive the closed-form
expression for the secrecy outage probability.
A. Connection Outage Probability
We first characterize the instantaneous SNR of the main
channel. Based on the channel estimation and limited feedback
model in Section II-B, we rewrite (1) as
y = (h^+m)vs+ nb = h^vs+mvs+ nb: (6)
Note that the estimate h^ and the selected beamforming vector
v are known at Bob. Therefore, Bob can exploit h^v for data
detection, and thus the actual instantaneous SNR of the main
channel is given by
b =
bjh^vj2
bjmvj2 + 1 : (7)
We define v = jh^vj2=kh^k2, ^b = bkh^k2 and ~b = bjmvj2,
and rewrite (7) as
b =
v^b
~b + 1
: (8)
In this work we adopt the codebook design criterion pre-
sented in [9–11], such that the cumulative density distribution
(CDF) of v in (8) can be approximated as
Fv (x) =

0; 0  x  1  "
1 N(1  x)M 1; 1  "  x  1 (9)
where " = 2 
B
M 1 and N = 2B . We also present the statistics
of ^b and ~b to facilitate our performance analysis. We define
b = b
 
1  2m

and b = b2m, such that the CDF of ^b
and ~b can be written as
F^b (x) = 1  exp

  x
b
M 1X
m=0
(x=b)
m
  (m+ 1)
(10)
and
F~b (x) = 1  exp

  x
b

; (11)
respectively. Aided by (11), we further find that the distribution
of the actual SNR (i.e., b) conditioned on its quantized
estimation (i.e., v^b) can be written as
Fbjv^b (y jx ) = exp

  1
b

x
y
  1

u

x
y
  1

; (12)
where u() denotes the unit step function.
Here, we propose such a back off strategy: Given a certain
CQI, Alice backs off from v^b to backoff = v^b= and sends
at a rate of log(1 + backoff ), where  is the back off factor
and  > 1. Clearly, if b falls blow backoff , the connection
outage event occurs. Thus for a given CQI, the connection
outage probability can be formulated as
pco = Pr fb < backoff jv^b g : (13)
With the aid of (12), we derive pco as
pco = Fbjv^b

v^b

jv^b

= exp

   1
b

: (14)
Based on (14), we find that the expression for pco is inde-
pendent of the CQI. That is, our proposed back off design
provides an easy expression to determine the connection
outage probability.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
Considering the MMSE estimator at Eve, the received signal
at Eve can be written as
z = (g^ +w)vs+ ne = g^vs+wvs+ ne: (15)
Based on (15), the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel is given by
e =
ejg^vj2
ejwvj2 + 1 : (16)
We define ^e = ejg^vj2 and ~e = ejwvj2, and thus (16) can
be rewritten as
e =
^e
~e + 1
: (17)
Note that v is completely determined by Bob’s estimated
channel vector h^. Thus v is independent of the Eve’s estimated
channel vector g^ and error vector w. Furthermore, since v is
an unitary vector, both g^v and w^v are i.i.d. complex Gaussian
entries with variance 1  2w and 2w, respectively. Therefore,
the CDF of e in (17) is derived as
Fe (x) =
Z 1
0
F^e ((1 + y)x) f~e (y) dy
= 1  e
e + ex
exp

  x
e

; (18)
where e = e
 
1  2w

and e = e2w.
For a given rate redundancy Re, the secrecy outage proba-
bility can be formulated as
pso = Pr fRe < Ceg = Pr

2Re   1 < e
	
=
e
e + e (2Re   1) exp

 2
Re   1
e

: (19)
In this work we assume that Eve’s instantaneous channel
knowledge is not available at Alice, but her statistical channel
knowledge (i.e., e) can be acquired by Alice. In the literature,
this assumption of available knowledge about e has been
stated in other secrecy studies, e.g. [12–15].
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
In this section, we design the secure transmission scheme
under a connection constraint (i.e., ) and a secrecy outage
constraint (i.e., ), respectively. We first present the condition
on CQI, which guarantees a positive secrecy rate under dual
outage constraints. We then investigate the secrecy throughput
performance by averaging the secrecy rate over all CQI
realizations.
A. Condition for Secure Transmission
Under dual connection and secrecy outage constraints, a
positive secrecy rate is not always available. Therefore, we first
establish the necessary and sufficient condition on the system
parameters to guarantee that a positive Rs is achievable.
Proposition 1: To achieve a positive confidential rate, the
CQI of the main channel must satisfy
CQI > th =
 
1 + b ln 
 1e ln  1 (20)
Proof: For a given CQI (i.e., v^b), the maximum allow-
able codeword rate implies the minimum back off factor. That
is, we have Rb;max = log(1 + v^b=min). By observing (14),
we find that under the connection outage constraint pco  ,
the minimum back off factor is
min = 1 + b ln 
 1: (21)
With the aid of (19), we show that under the secrecy outage
constraint pso  , the minimum required rate redundancy is
Re;min = log(1 + ), where  is the non-trivial solution to
the following equation:
 =
e
e + e
exp

  
e

: (22)
Although it is not tractable to determine an analytical solution
for , however, we find that the upper bound of  can be
formulated as ub = e ln  1. Towards a robust design,
in this work we exploit the upper bound of Re;min as the
minimum required rate redundancy, given by
Rube;min = log
 
1 + e ln 
 1 : (23)
To ensure that a positive secrecy rate is available, Rb;max >
Rube;min must be always satisfied. Based on (21) and (23), we
find that Rb;max > Rube;min means that v^b=min > e ln 
 1
is required. As such, we establish Proposition 1.
From a design perspective, Proposition 1 implies that the
“on-off” transmission scheme with the threshold th in (20)
is appropriate for our system. As such, in what follows we
adopt the on-off scheme to perform our transmission design.
B. On-Off Transmission Scheme
In this work, the on-off transmission strategy is operated
as following: when the CQI known at Alice is larger than
th, Alice starts to perform secure transmission with rate
parameters Rb;max and Rube;min in (23). Thus the achievable
secrecy rate for a given CQI is
Rs(v^b) = Rb  Re = log

1 + v^b=min
1 + e ln  1

: (24)
By applying such a strategy to determine the rate parame-
ters, we observe that pco =  is always true by substituting
min into (14). However, by substituting Rube;min into (19), the
secrecy outage probability is formulated as
pso =

1  e ln  ; (25)
which is always less than . Based on (25), we find that the
secrecy outage probability successively approximates  as we
go along increasing the pilot length T .
Next, we incorporate the connection outage and secrecy out-
age probabilities into the formulation of the throughput, form-
ing the secrecy throughput. Notably, the secrecy throughput
measures the average rate of the message which is successfully
decoded at the legitimate receiver while being kept confidential
to the eavesdropper. The secrecy throughput, , is defined as
 = pr&s
Z 1
th
Rs (x) fv^b (x) dx; (26)
where pr&s = (1   pco)(1   pso) denotes the reliable and
secure transmission probability, and fv^b (x) is the probability
density function (PDF) of v^b, given by
fv^b (x) =
N
b
exp

  x
b

  N
b
exp

  x
(1  ")b


M 2X
m=0
1
  (m+ 1)

"x
(1  ")b
m
: (27)
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Substituting (27) into (26), we derive the secrecy throughput
as
 =
(1  )
ln 2

1  
1 e ln 

(`1 + `2); (28)
where `1 is
`1 =  N exp

min
b

Ei

 min (1  e ln )
b

; (29)
`2 is
`2 =exp

min
(1  ")b
M 1X
m=0
mX
n=0

  min
(1  ")b
m n
 (1 N"
m)	n
  (n+ 1)  (m  n+ 1) ; (30)
and 	 is
	n =
8>><>>:
 Ei

 min(1+e ln 
 1)
(1 ")b

; n = 0
 

n;
min(1+e ln  1)
(1 ")b

; n  1
(31)
respectively. We clarify that Ei() is the Exponential integral
function defined in [16, Eq. (8.211)], and   (; ) is the incom-
plete Gamma function defined in [16, Eq. (8.352)].
C. Secrecy Throughput Loss Caused by Limited Feedback
We clarify that limited feedback comes with some per-
formance loss of the secrecy throughput compared with the
adaptation techniques with perfect channel information via
unlimited feedback. We now characterize this performance
loss. First, we formulate the secrecy throughput with perfect
CDI feedback (i.e., v = 1) as
v=1 = pr&s
Z 1
th
Rs (x) f^b (x) dx; (32)
where f^b can be derived by taking the first order derivative of
F^b given by (10). Using the similar method of mathematical
derivation for  in (28), v=1 is obtained as
v=1 =
(1  )
ln 2

1  
1 e ln 

exp


b
M 1X
m=0
mX
l=0
l
 1
  (l + 1)  (m  l + 1)

 min
b
m l
; (33)
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Fig. 1. Secrecy throughput versus b for e = 0 dB, T = 2, B = M ,
 = 0:1 and  = 0:1.
where  is given by
l =
8>><>>:
 Ei

 min(1+e ln 
 1)
b

; l = 0
 

l;
min(1+e ln  1)
b

; l  1
(34)
Based on (28) and (33), we find that  = v=1    is the
secrecy throughput loss caused by the limited feedback.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we give some numerical results to examine
the accuracy of our above analysis and show the impact of the
outage constraints on system performance.
It is worth mentioning that for the derivation of the secrecy
throughput in (28), the approximated CDF of v was used.
That is, (28) is also an approximate expression. To characterize
the accuracy level of this approximation, Fig. 1 plots the ap-
proximate secrecy throughput versus b for different values of
transmit antenna number M , along which the accurate secrecy
throughput are provided with Monte Carlo simulation results.
The quantization codebook is generated based on the design
criterion in [9–11]. As can be seen, the differences between
the exact results and our analytical approximations are almost
negligible. That is, the considered quantization approximation
has only a negligible effect on the secrecy throughput. As
such, the closed-form expression (28) derived based on the
quantization approximation can accurately predict the secrecy
throughput with training and limited feedback.
Note that in Fig. 1 the dual outage constraints are fixed
to 0:1. One may also want to know the impact of the specific
choice of  and  on the secrecy throughput performance. This
is investigated in Fig. 2, which plots the secrecy throughput
versus the connection and secrecy outage constraints. Since
Monte Carlo simulation requires an exhaustive search over
the codebook, and the number of entries in the codebook
grows exponentially with the number of feedback bits, simu-
lation results are not shown in this figure. We first observe
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Fig. 2. Secrecy throughput versus  and  for b = 3 dB, e = 0 dB,
M = 4, T = 20 and B = 5.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy throughput versus B for b = 3 dB, e = 0 dB, T = 5
and  =  = 0:1.
that the secrecy throughput reaches its maximum value at
( = 0:089;  = 0:314) and decays gradually toward the edge.
We further observe that for a fixed  (or ), the optimal  (or
) maximizing the secrecy throughput decreases continuously
along with the  (or ) increasing. In particular, the two black
lines in Fig. 2 show that the optimal  decreases from 0:39
to 0:26 when  increases from 0 to 1; while the optimal 
decreases from 0:30 to 0:05 when  increases from 0 to 1.
To examine the secrecy throughput loss caused by the
limited feedback, Fig. 3 plots the secrecy throughput versus B
with different values of M for two scenarios, namely, perfect
CDI feedback and quantized CDI feedback. We clarify that
B = B=M is the normalized feedback bits, which can be
treated as the number of feedback bits used for each transmit
antenna at Alice. We first observe that for a given M , the
performance loss becomes smaller when B increases. This is
not surprising since increasing feedback bits provides more
perfect CDI available at Alice. We then observe that to for a
fixed B, increasing the number of transmit antennas leads to a
greater performance loss. For example, when M = 4, B = 5
is sufficient to achieve the secrecy throughput attainable with
perfect CDI feedback. When M = 5, B = 6 is required to
achieve the same performance. This observation indicates that
when M increases, more feedback bits for each antenna are
needed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the design of secure transmission
scheme in MISOSE scenario by explicitly taking account of
the training and feedback overhead. Conditioned on the partial
channel knowledge to the legitimate receiver and the statistical
channel knowledge to the eavesdropper, we designed an on-
off-based secure beamforming transmission scheme under dual
outage constraints. We highlighted that this designed scheme
is suitable for the deployment of physical layer security in
practical communication systems.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF fv^b (x) IN (27)
Since v and ^b are independent, the CDF of v^b can be
formulated as [7]
Fv^b (x) = Pr fv^b  xg =
Z 1
0
Fv

x
y

f^b (y) dy
=
Z x
0
f^b (y) dy +
Z x
1 "
x
 
1 N

1  x
y
M 1!
f^b (y) dy
=
Z x
1 "
0
f^b (y) dy  N
 = F^b

x
1  "

 N
; (35)
where 
 is derived as

 =
Z x
1 "
x

1  x
y
M 1
f^b (y) dy
=
Z x
1 "
x

1  x
y
M 1
yM 1
  (M)Mb
exp

  y
b

dy
= exp

  x
b
Z x
1 "
x
(y   x)M 1
  (M)Mb
exp

 y   x
b

dy
= exp

  x
b

F^b

"x
1  "

: (36)
Thus we have
Fv^b (x) = F^b

x
1  "

 N exp

  x
b

F^b

"x
1  "

:
(37)
Substituting (10) into (37), we have
Fv^b (x) =1 N exp

  x
b

  exp

  x
(1  ")b


M 1X
m=0
1 N"m
  (m+ 1)

x
(1  ")b
m
: (38)
By deriving the first order derivative of (38), we obtain the
closed-form expression for fv^b (x) as (27).
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